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Not just another variable: untangling the spatialities of power in social–
ecological systems
Micah L. Ingalls 1
ABSTRACT. Increased attention has been paid to how the spatial dimensions of social–ecological systems are formative in shaping
their ability to negotiate change and remain resilient. This paper moves this research further by exploring how diverse forms of power
play a crucial role in shaping these spatial dimensions and the production of social–ecological outcomes. Grounding these explorations
in a National Protected Area in Lao PDR, this paper explores how power relationships operate through the spatial and temporal
domains of complex systems. Findings suggest (at least) four important insights: (1) the exercise of power materializes in policies and
programs and becomes written onto the spaces of social–ecological systems through boundary creation, zonation, and other social
processes that (re)define spatial meanings; these meanings vary by social actor; (2) policies and programs map out unevenly across
space and time as they interact with antecedent social–ecological conditions in ways that preclude linear causal relationships between
policy and outcomes; (3) although local in their expression, spatialized disputes in social–ecological systems draw on cross-scalar
discourses and networks of power to bolster, undermine, and (de)legitimize competing environmental and social narratives; and (4)
however powerful institutions and actor-networks may be, they are never fully hegemonic as they are attenuated by other discourses
and operations of power, although these all play out across a highly uneven sociopolitical terrain. Paying greater attention to the spatial
and temporal dynamics of power may be much more than a project of introducing yet another variable into the already complex
admixture of analytic elements. Rather, by rendering these explicit as objects of analysis, common insights may change entirely or even
be overturned.
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INTRODUCTION
Conceptualizing social and ecological variables in complex
systems as conjoined elements within a larger, social–ecological
complex has been particularly productive in shaping the ways we
understand dynamic processes within real-world systems. By
focusing attention on how these social–ecological systems
negotiate change processes and selforganize following
disturbance, and the ways in which key system elements are
retained, lost, or modified, we have gained important insights into
how to manage complex systems despite substantial uncertainty
and unpredictability (Folke 2006, Nelson et al. 2007).
Understanding complex systems and applying this understanding
to addressing real-world problems require that abstract principles
be grounded in particular systems—systems that are necessarily
bounded in space and time. In so doing, we are reminded that
social–ecological systems are geographic objects. In itself, this
observation is not surprising. It does, however, open up vast
possibilities for exploring how key elements of social–ecological
systems are rooted in, and map onto, space and time and the
implications of these space–time dynamics for system
functioning. Recognizing the ineluctability of space–time in
social–ecological systems, recent scholarship has begun to explore
the concept of spatial resilience (e.g., Cumming 2011, Allen et al.
2016, Cumming et al. 2016). Spatial resilience focuses on the role
of spatial variation and temporal change within complex systems
and may be defined as “the ways in which spatial variation—
including such things as spatial location, context, connectivity,
and dispersal—influences (or is influenced by) the resilience of a
social–ecological system” (Cumming 2011:3). Internal elements
of interest to spatial resilience include the spatial arrangement of
system components, spatial variation in internal phases (e.g.,
succession), and the size, shape, number, and character of
boundaries. External elements include context, connectivity with
exogenous systems, and processes, spatially driven feedbacks, and
subsidies.  
Although these internal and external elements in spatial resilience
function between systems at the same scalar level, evidence
suggests that cross-scale dynamics between higher and lower
organizational units play a particularly formative role in shaping
the spatial resilience of systems, including the ways in which
resources and risks are distributed between scales (Adger et al.
2006, Nelson et al. 2007). Along the social dimension, cross-scale
interactions between institutional structures and the agency of
local people play a central role in the production of social–
ecological outcomes across space and time (Carpenter and Brock
2004, Pain and Levine 2012). These cross-scale interactions may
either support or undermine the ability of local systems to
selforganize in response to disturbance events. Given this, a
complex systems perspective suggests that the degree to which
management is decentralized—giving greater decision-making
control to local system managers—may play a particularly
important role in conditioning social–ecological dynamics and
the resilience of local systems, for example, by facilitating tighter
coupling between ecological changes and social responses
(Cumming 2011). Furthermore, the processes through which
these dynamics play out—the degree to which these interactions
are equitable and participatory—may either undermine or
strengthen trust between local managers and larger social
institutions such as those of state resource managers (Lebel et al.
2006, Nelson et al. 2007). These cross-scale dynamic processes are
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necessarily spatial in their operation and relate closely to
questions of legitimacy, solidarity, and justice (Adger 2001,
Okereke 2006, Ingalls and Stedman 2016).  
Given the dominance of human influence in almost all social–
ecological systems, interrogating these social dimensions is a
central concern (Bolliger et al. 2005, Barrett and Constas 2014).
Importantly, the social processes that shape social–ecological
systems play out across an unequal field of power wherein the
resources available for shaping social–ecological outcomes are
distributed differentially, as are their risks (Escobar 1998, Watts
2009, Ingalls and Stedman 2016). Insofar as these dynamics
function across spatially situated channels and networks and
distribute resources and risks across space and through time
(Adger 2001), power in social–ecological systems may be
interrogated explicitly with reference to its spatial and temporal
dimensions. This paper thus focuses attention specifically on how
power is active in shaping the space–time dimensions of complex
systems’ processes and outcomes. This kind of analysis, I suggest,
may be much more than a project of introducing yet another
variable into the already complex admixture of multivariate
social–ecological systems analysis. Rather, explicitly incorporating
questions of power into systems analysis has the potential not
only to enhance analytic clarity but may even surprise us,
overturning the sorts of findings that might otherwise be
produced (Massey 1999).  
Power has, of course, a multiplicity of meanings and analytic
applications. Perhaps the most obvious way of thinking about
power is as dominance, located primarily in the apparatuses of
the state or social actors bearing its delegated authority and in
which force, violence, and coercion are strongly implied. Such a
conceptualization, however, tends to limit attention to the formal
apparatus of society, its institutions, and explicit policies.
Cognizant of this conceptualization of power—but also
elaborating on and departing from it—I here employ a
Foucaultian view that emphasizes the multiplicity of power within
and across society and its overlapping, fluid, and negotiated
nature (Foucualt 1982, 2000). Such a view of power allows us to
move beyond an analysis of formal institutions and legal
codification to interrogate their subtext and so better to
understand the full scope of their influence. It also allows us to
focus attention not only on how power may be destructive and
exclusionary, but also how it is generative, creative, and
productive.  
As I have said, these abstractions are best concretized in the
complexities of real-world systems. This paper, therefore, presents
a spatially explicit interrogation of power relationships within a
largely forested social–ecological system in and around Xe Pian
National Protected Area (NPA) in the Lao People's Democratic
Republic (Lao PDR, or Laos) along the Laos–Cambodian border
in Southeast Asia (Fig. 1), exploring some of the ways in which
the overlapping spatialities of power within this system have been
produced and legitimized, and, in their operation, function to
shape the resilience of the system to change.  
In this analysis, I will focus on four interrelated thematic
emphases. The first of these involves the ways in which power
maps onto space, or spatializes, within complex systems. This
occurs through a number of different mechanisms such as the
creation of administrative or managerial spaces, processes of
boundary formation, spatial classification and zonation, tenure
regimes, and spatially situated resource claims as well as the
particular and socially differentiated meanings that these
spatializations carry. Second, I will emphasize the role played by
antecedent social–ecological conditions in the production of
these spatializations and the ways in which these contextual
factors facilitate or impede particular system processes. Third, I
will focus on the ways in which discourses of power and
knowledge claims at higher scales intersect with local social
disputes and power dynamics, and the ways in which local actors
draw on these to (de)legitimize contested claims. Finally, while
recognizing the highly uneven social landscape of power, I will
emphasize the ways in which power is attenuated, shaped, and
fragmented not only laterally by competing social institutions,
but also vertically by the agential action of local communities.
Fig. 1. Xe Pian NPA forest types and geographic context
RESEARCH SETTING AND METHODS
Xe Pian NPA was established by decree of the Prime Minister of
Laos in October 1993. Comprising of approximately 2,600 km²
of semievergreen and dry dipterocarp forest types, Xe Pian NPA
has been a historically significant habitat for numerous globally
important populations of birds and mammals. Biodiversity
surveys carried out in 1993 found more than 350 species of birds,
including at least eight bird species of global conservation
significance (Duckworth et al. 1993). In addition to historic
populations of Asian elephant (Elephas maximus), large cats
(Panthera spp.), dhole (Cuon alpines), Asiatic black bear (Ursus
tibetanus), sun bear (Helarctos malayanus) (Scotson 2012),
banteng (Bos javanicus) (Steinmetz 2004), and Irrawady river
dolphins (Orcaella brevirostris) (Baird 1997), Xe Pian NPA was
also considered to harbor the largest known population of gibbon
(Nomascus spp. and Hyloblates spp.) in the world (Timmins et al.
1993, Duckworth et al. 1993).  
Xe Pian NPA is also a space inhabited and used by local human
communities, including both a permanent population within the
NPA as well as seasonal migrants. In total, more than 10,000
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individuals depend on the NPA for a variety of purposes,
exhibiting a high degree of natural resource dependency that
varies by community: some households purchase as little as 3%
of their consumable resources (World Wide Fund for Nature
(WWF) 2013). Local communities utilize a wide diversity of
species for food, fibers, medicines, and marketed products. Baird
(1997), for example, estimated that some communities derived 40–
90% of their protein from local aquatic resources. Ingalls and
Luangsackda (2009) identified more than 250 species of plants
and animals used by local communities along the northwestern
extremity of the NPA, a finding similar to that of Elkington et
al. (2014) in the NPA’s northeast. Malva nut (Scaphium
macropodium), berberine vine (Coscinium usitatum), resins from
dipterocarp species, and semidomestic varieties of cardamom
(Amomum villosum) are all commercially significant species that
contribute to household incomes, particularly for poorer
households.  
Alongside a high degree of resource dependency lies persistent
poverty. In 2015, 27.6% of families around Xe Pian fell below the
national poverty line, and in some villages, poverty rates at the
household level exceeded 53% (Lao Statistics Bureau (LSB) 2016).
Community surveys carried out in 2012 indicated that 75% of
households reported food insufficiency (defined as rice shortage)
ranging from 3 to 10 months of the year (WWF 2013). Food
insecurity generally relates to a low degree of land holding
amongst local communities, with the majority cultivating less
than 1 ha. Due to the high degree of endemic poverty and food
insecurity, as well as anticipation of increased flooding and heat
stress under changing climate conditions (Meynell et al. 2014),
Xe Pian NPA is considered to be a high-risk area of priority for
Lao PDR, a country more generally considered to be highly
vulnerable to climate risks (Global Facility for Disaster Reduction
and Recovery (GFDRR) 2011). These climate vulnerabilities,
together with intractable issues of poverty and the rapid and
severe decline in species diversity and abundance (e.g., Steinmetz
2004, Scotson 2012), presage a number of problems for system
functioning into the future and lend urgency to the need for
revised approaches for navigating social–ecological change.  
Since its inception in 1993, Xe Pian NPA has attracted multiple
and somewhat overlapping conservation and development
projects, including the Lao–Swedish Forestry Cooperation
Program (LSFCP), a number of projects under the WWF, the
Global Association for People and Environment (GAPE), the
Asian Development Bank-funded Biodiversity Corridors
Initiative (BCI), and, most recently, a Reduced Emissions from
Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) project
supported by WWF-Austria. These programs and the discourses
surrounding them form core objects of my analysis here.
Understanding the processes of power and their social–ecological
outcomes involves not only the assessment of what policies and
programs say they will do, but also how they work out in practice
(see Arts and Buizer 2009). The research approach thus
maintained an analytic dualism between these dimensions,
employing both the analysis of policies and project
documentation (project reports, management plans, etc.), as well
as interviews with government officials at national, provincial,
and district levels between 2012 and 2017 (n = 26), international
and national experts (n = 13), and the communities in the NPA
and surrounding it. Engagement with local communities
primarily took the form of focal group discussion (n = 272
individuals in nine villages) between 2012 and 2015, supplemented
by local key person interviews (n = 16). Focal group engagements
involved semistructured discussions, participatory resource
mapping, and community-led field surveys to explore local and
state management arrangements, historical processes of zoning
and land-use planning, the creation of village and NPA
boundaries, patterns of resource use, and norms of access.
Wherever possible, interviews and focal group discussions were
audiorecorded in Lao language using a handheld recording device
and transcribed by the author. Data analysis involved review and
selective coding of transcripts and handwritten notes, concept
mapping, and identification of key elements and processes
reported by participants. In order to situate these local analyses
within broader institutional processes and to analyze relevant
policy discourses, I also participated in 23 national dialogs and
working groups in Lao PDR.  
In the sections that follow, I will trace the evolving dynamics of
space, time, and power within this social–ecological system in a
loosely chronological fashion, asking (1) What relationships of
power manifest within the spaces of the social–ecological system
—surrounding what objects and between what interests—and
how do they interact with one another? (2) What discourses are
employed to (de)legitimize these spatializations of power? and (3)
With what implications for social–ecological system processes and
outcomes?
FORTRESS CONSERVATION AND THE ORIGINS OF
THE NPA
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, when timber exports had become
an increasingly important source of foreign exchange in Laos and
the principal source of revenue for the state treasury (Ireson and
Ireson 1991), the government of Laos enacted two closely related
measures aimed at limiting environmental degradation and
ensuring a sustainable forest resource base. The first of these was
Laos’s decision to participate in the multilateral Tropical Forest
Action Plan, a plan aimed at professionalizing the forest industry
by clarifying and bolstering rules of (largely state-based) forest
governance, and limiting unauthorized and inefficient use of
forest resources (Guttal 2011). The second measure, that which
would result in the creation of Xe Pian NPA, was a broad-based
exploratory assessment for a system of national nature reserves,
carried out largely by foreign conservation scientists beginning in
1988 with support from the International Union for the
Conservation of Nature (IUCN) and the LSFCP. To specify the
appropriate local objects of this intervention and map out the
nature reserve system, Berkmüller et al. (1995) drew on supralocal
spatializations, most notably MacKinnon and MacKinnon’s
(1986) assessment of the Indomalayan realm, to identify areas
proportionately representing regional biogeographic types (Fig.
2a). In order to localize these regional spatial categories, planners
took into consideration the pre-existing network of largely
unmanaged forest reserves created under the French
administration of the former Kingdom of Laos, and then
screened these through additional selection criteria including the
presence of key species of global conservation interest, large
undisturbed tracts of forest with 75% of original forest cover (over
a minimum of 500 km²), and the degree of threat to these
attributes. These national assessments recommended a total of
68 forested areas for gazettement in the national reserve system
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(Salter and Phanthavong 1989). Scientific proposals did not
directly translate into the final reserve areas. Rather, the areas of
proposed reserves were weighed against other concerns and
interests of state authorities whose commercial and
developmentalist agendas (such as land concessions and timber
interests) might be put at risk (interviews, 2014–2015). The spaces
slated for conservation emerged from these spatial negotiations
(Fig. 2b). Two areas, Xe Pian and Dong Kalo, would later be
amalgamated into the Xe Pian forest reserve in 1993. A
particularly intensive on-the-ground survey effort was carried out
between 1992 and 1993 for Xe Pian and Dong Kalo in order to
further characterize key conservation values and risks to these.
Local livelihood activities, especially hunting, fishing, and
subsistence agriculture—typically described as “encroachment”
and “degradation”—alongside commercial logging were
identified as the primary risks to be managed for to secure
environmental values. Timmins et al. (1993:6) concluded that Xe
Pian was “relatively pristine” but “will be irrecoverably degraded
without immediate measures to curb human use.”
Fig. 2. Lao PDR NPA system with biogeographic zones.
Sources: zones adapted from MacKinnon and MacKinnon
(1986), Salter and Phanthavong (1989). Proposed reserve areas
at (i) were excluded from the final NPA due to plans for
agricultural development related to commercial coffee
plantations, whereas the area at (ii) was excluded due to state
interests in timber values (Dwyer et al. 2015).
These assessments reflected particular sets of assumptions
regarding nature and its relationship to local communities. The
environmental narratives that proved formative in the creation of
Xe Pian legitimized a fortress-like approach to conservation,
defining “nature spaces” in very particular ways. This “fortress
conservation” model of environmental governance (see Davis
2007) carried with it (at least) three important assumptions: (1)
nature is something quite distinct from human society, (2) it is
immediately threatened by the livelihood activities of local people,
and (3) urgent intervention by state forest agencies and, in this
case, foreign conservation nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) is the necessary fix. These measures were explicitly
spatial, (re)defining and separating the spaces of nature from the
spaces of local people (see also Baird 2009). Duckworth et al.
(1993) who carried out some of these surveys, recommended that
human uses be controlled in the northern, more populated areas
of Xe Pian, and be excluded entirely from the main block in the
central portion of the reserve, and that all clearance of vegetation
around wetlands be stopped entirely, regardless of location.  
These surveys served as the technical basis for the establishment
of the national forest reserve system by Prime Minister Decree
164 in 1993 (Government of the Lao People's Democratic
Republic (GoL) 1993). Article 4 of the Decree included specific
provision for the regulation of human uses inside the forest
reserves, including prohibition of the holding of lands, the
erection of houses, or the expansion of agricultural fields,
allowance for the collection of nontraditional forest products
(NTFPs) only by state permission, an absolute prohibition on
“slash and burn agriculture” (or shifting cultivation, the primary
livelihood strategy across much of Lao PDR’s uplands) and the
removal of any trees, with the exception of sampling for approved
scientific purposes.  
In the span of 5 years, these forests were thus redefined with
reference to their conservation value in securing species of global
significance against (primarily local) forest users and were
incorporated into the national forest estate under the direct
administration of government forest agencies. Whether a
particular space was incorporated into the reserve system was the
product of macroscalar processes—the 1986 global biogeographic
mapping of MacKinnon and MacKinnon, the conservationist
imaginings of foreign scientific advisors, and competing
commercial interests of state authorities—all with material
consequences for local social–ecological systems, explored below.
MODERNIZING THE NPA, EXCEPTIONALISM, AND
NEGOTIATION
In the years that followed the 1993 Decree, modernization of the
NPA became a focal concern of managers who sought to address
the threats posed by local communities and other resource users.
Situated firmly within a modernist conceptualization of nature
—as something quite distinct from social systems and an object
to be categorized, mapped, zoned, and conserved in particular
ways and toward particular ends (Spaargaren and Mol 1992,
Freudenburg 2005)—the modernization of environmental
governance in Xe Pian was presented as something selfevident
and uncontestable. Because regularizing and modernizing nature
entails the simplification of social–ecological space and,
especially, the differentiation of social space from ecological space
(Escobar 1999), they produce displacement effects (Agrawal and
Redford 2009) whether through displacement of peoples to
outside protected areas or, perhaps more applicable here, in situ
displacement where the spaces of local communities are redefined
by conservation authorities, and access to certain resource uses
are precluded. Under the guidance of foreign technical experts
and an increasingly professionalized national forestry
administration, conservation policies found material expression
in a number of spatial processes in Xe Pian, beginning first with
the demarcation of the NPA followed by village-level zonation
and boundary making through the Land and Forest Allocation
(LFA) program, culminating in the elaboration of the NPA
management plan in early 2000.
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Demarcating the NPA
The WWF’s (1997) assessment indicated that clear and
enforceable boundary demarcation would support not only
conservation but also local interests and exclusionary place claims
—a win–win. Although biodiversity assessments were carried out
in the field, the boundaries of the NPA itself  were imagined largely
by resource managers at the central government level. One official
involved in the designation of the NPA system reflected, “The
NPA boundaries were just created on a map, no one really went
to the ground level. Someone sat in an office and went [draws a
circle in the air] with a marker.” Although PM 164 had established
Xe Pian and specified its area and boundaries on paper, the
process of physically demarcating the NPA took several years and
still remains a point of contention. In practice, the actual physical
demarcation of the boundary proceeded irregularly and varied
considerably with regard to the degree of local participation. The
forestry official responsible for informing local communities of
PM 164 reflected, “I remember the day Xe Pian was announced.
We drove around to all the villages and informed them the forest
was now a reserve. Some of the villagers, they were not happy
about it. They were afraid the government was going to take their
land. We argued with them and, in the end, they agreed. We just
used the Road 18b as the boundary since this was easiest”
(interview, June 2015). An elder in a village along the northern
extremity of the NPA recalled, “one day a truck came, and they
just put the [boundary] stone down. They didn’t even talk to us.
They say now that the NPA boundary is right there, but this was
all our land. Their land is way over there, more than a kilometer
away” (April 2013). Although it was envisioned that place claims
between forest managers and local communities could be shared
but differentiated through overlapping sets of powers and
responsibilities within areas traditionally under village
management, the boundary of Xe Pian has come to be viewed as
a symbolic as well as statutory differentiation of space and
ownership. In one village whose traditional boundaries extend
well into the NPA, a local elder was unequivocal, reflecting a
perspective very common amongst participants across all villages:
“This area belongs to the village but there, beyond their boundary,
all belongs to government and not to us” (interview, June 2015,
see referenced area at point (i) in Fig. 3b).
The Land and Forest Allocation (LFA) program
The demarcation of the NPA boundary was seen as a precondition
to secure conservation outcomes, the presence of villages within
and overlapping with Xe Pian required additional zonation and
demarcation. The LFA program, enacted throughout the
protected area toward the end of the 1990s was one of the key
mechanisms employed to formalize these spatial differentiations
at the local level, with the explicit goals of mitigating agricultural
expansion and eradicating shifting cultivation. The LFA involved
the identification and mapping of traditional village areas
according to specified (and predefined) use zones, with such
designations as “residential areas,” “conservation forest,” “use
forests,” “agricultural land,” etc. (Fig. 3b is exemplary). These
maps then served as social documents recognizing (some) local
customary place claims but also as regulatory instruments to
sanction (and, by implication, censure) various local resource
uses. In an effort to secure environmental values of interest to
conservation managers, the LFA thus reduced the land available
to local communities and (re)defined the meanings of particular
spaces with normative (and legal) implications for local resource
governance. Although this intervention was justified on the
grounds that zonation and mapping of social–ecological systems
was a necessary precondition for sustainable resource
management and enhanced tenure security (Fujita and Phanvilay
2004), its application in practice suggests several adverse
outcomes. Whatever its intention, the LFA has been widely
criticized in Xe Pian with regard to its technical and procedural
insufficiencies (GoL 2000), more generally for exacerbating
resource scarcity and food insecurity, accelerating soil
degradation by unsustainably intensifying agricultural activities
(Lestrelin et al. 2005), undermining conservation objectives
(Ducourtieux et al. 2005), and as a willful attempt to
reterritorialize large tracts of land and place these under the
control of the state, rendering them available for economic
concessions (Vandergeest 2003, Barney 2009).
Fig. 3. a. Xe Pian NPA detail and b. LFA example from Ban
(Village) Thahou. (a) Military control over strategic areas was
established by PM111, later excluded from the REDD+ project
along the with Xe Pian Main Block. (b) Village areas and land-
use zones established by LFA. Village conservation forest areas
overlapping with the NPA at (i) where village-level governance
has been largely ceded to state forestry administration.
Alongside these direct outcomes, the LFA also introduced scalar
mismatch between the management spaces of local communities
and broader social–ecological system processes by delimiting and
reducing the effective spaces of their operation (Cash et al. 2006,
Cumming et al. 2006). Because of the legal ramifications of these
categories, the particular spatializations produced through the
LFA process in Laos have remained remarkably persistent
through time, in many cases, showing very little change over the
past two decades despite subsequent planning processes and
changing market dynamics (Dwyer 2013). Thus, the LFA system
functioned to harden system boundaries at a particular point in
time according to predetermined use zones, limiting the ability of
local communities to respond adaptively to changing system
conditions, resource use, and conservation needs through time,
potentially undermining system resilience (see Cumming 2011,
Nelson et al. 2007).
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The 2000 Xe Pian management plan
In early 2002, the Global Environment Facility (GEF) supported
the development of a management plan for the NPA (GoL 2000)
that formalized the fortress conservation approach through a
modernist conceptualization of nature. Under the management
plan, mapping and zoning of Xe Pian became more detailed, with
a continued emphasis on mitigating local threats to biodiversity
values through regulation, patrolling, and law enforcement.
Conservation planning continued to limit—although not
eliminate—the scope for local management in favor of
management through the state forest agencies. That local
communities were not involved in the development of the
management plan is indicative and was legitimized by
conservation planners on the grounds that “the majority of
communities living in and around Xe Pian NBCA do not have
sufficient understanding... to participate meaningfully in
preparing a management plan” (GoL 2000:5).  
It was not only the putative ignorance of local communities and
the destructiveness of their livelihood strategies, however, but also
their sheer numbers that were of concern. The management plan
identified population growth as a key risk and affirmed the right
of the state to intervene to preserve conservation values,
instituting a blanket proscription on the migration of households
into the NPA. The WWF (1997:87) further recommended the
promotion of contraception and birth spacing, concluding that
“unless the human population in and around XP [Xe Pian] is
curbed, trying to save or protect threatened animal species in XP
may be futile.”  
Whereas proposed interventions in the management plan
otherwise largely reflected previous prescriptions provided under
PM 164 and the recommendations of technical advisors during
Xe Pian’s formulation (e.g., Duckworth et al. 1993, Timmins et
al. 1993, WWF 1997), the management plan inaugurated a very
important innovation: a turn toward an environmental-
exceptional mode of governance (sensu McSweeney 1996), an
explicit circumvention of normal legal processes in an effort to
address pressing issues of biodiversity decline and environmental
degradation. This exceptional mode of governance is perhaps
most clearly manifest in the approach taken to two issues: (1) the
degree of regulatory control of the protected area itself, and (2)
provisions made for the territorial expansion of its management
area. In the first case, the management plan specified that Xe Pian
should be classified as an IUCN Category II National Park,
allowing tourism, research, and spiritual and cultural values, but
precluding even indigenous livelihood activities where these
conflicted with superordinate conservation goals. The
management plan further stipulated that until Xe Pian was legally
designated as a Category II National Park, “it should be managed
as if  it had such a designation” (GoL 2000:61) with support from
law enforcement agencies. In the second case, that of the inclusion
of areas not specified in PM 164, we see a similar approach.
Although the management plan interpreted PM 164 to require
Prime Ministerial approval for the retraction of NPA boundaries,
it nevertheless allowed for their expansion—thus the enclosure of
more space under a particular mode of environmental governance
—at the discretion of forestry authorities who would manage
these incorporated spaces “as if  they were part of the NPA until
such a time as was legally recognized” (GoL 2000:20). The most
ambitious attempt at this extrajudiciary enclosure involved the
proposal to include the so-called Xe Khampho Extension area,
connecting Xe Pian to Dong Hua Sao NPA in the north (Fig. 3a).
During the early stages of the forest reserve system, this area was
of particular interest to conservation advocates as a connectivity
corridor between the two NPAs. Although this area was not
included under PM 164 due to the interests of provincial
authorities in its high-value timber (Dwyer et al. 2015), it was
nevertheless incorporated into the administrative space of the
NPA management plan with the provision that it should be
regulated until such a time as its standing could be legally
established. In the end, the Xe Khampho area was incorporated
as a state-managed Biodiversity Corridor with support from the
Asian Development Bank. The implications of these legal-
exceptional proposals are significant. Although ostensibly
promoting the rule of law and a state-centric narrative of
biodiversity conservation, these provisions legitimized special,
extra-legal measures to secure biodiversity values through the
discretionary enclosure of lands by forestry agencies in a manner
that circumvented normal legal processes and associated social
and procedural safeguards.  
In the years that followed NPA, authorities had to deal with the
practical reality of implementing NPA management policies
against antecedent territorial claims of local communities.
Among government officials participating in this research, there
was a marked ambivalence about the rights of communities within
these forested areas. One forestry official (interview, June 2015)
reminded me “it is not like in your country. We already had people
living in these forests, we could not just move them out. In the
beginning, we considered it, but it would be very expensive and
we couldn’t afford to move them.” A senior official at the Ministry
of Natural Resources and Environment (MONRE), whose
mandate includes NPA management, reflected similarly on the
difficulty of spatially differentiating these place claims (October
2014) “we need to decide the limits of the areas of the villages
inside the NPAs. Where does the village area end and the
government’s area begin? Where are they forbidden to clear, or
do they need to be resettled outside the NPA altogether?” Such
questions of state vs. village control of space remain a key point
of contention in contemporary reforms of land administration.
In 2014, the National Assembly requested management agencies
to revise and redelineate land and forest areas under the state
administration (National Assembly 2014). One senior land
administration official responsible for this redelineation was
trenchant, “This process must begin first at the national level, we
cannot ask the villagers. For sure, the villages will want to take
whatever land they can get. We need to define first what belongs
to us, and then after that ask them” (interview 2017).
Implementation of spatial enclosure and categorization on the
ground suggested a degree of give-and-take. An elder in one
village inside Xe Pian (June 2015) recalled, “When they first came
to announce the establishment of Xe Pian, we really argued with
them. We said ‘we have been more than 100 years, we have lands
here, we have rice paddies! How will we live?’ It was like the fon
la vong [a traditional Lao dance], we went round and round with
them. In the end, they said we could keep the fields we already
had, but we could not open new fields.” The management plan
formalized these spatial negotiations, allowing resident
communities the right to a “basic standard of living” but with the
proviso that “individuals and families who aspire to more than
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this will be encouraged to leave the protected area and seek
opportunities to realize their ambitions elsewhere” (GoL
2000:11). Poulsen and Luanglath (2005) record at least one
incident where this regulation had to be enforced in a case where
a young household had created new agricultural land and were
subsequently disciplined and forced to find land outside of the
NPA. Perhaps a more surprising outcome of these negotiations
was that conservation advocates were not in the end able to sustain
the level of control envisioned for the reserve, which was
downgraded to IUCN Category VI Protected Areas with
Sustainable Use of Natural Resources.  
Policies and conservation measures to mitigate the risk that local
communities might expand their agricultural areas due to
population growth or a desire to increase their standard of living
intersected problematically with social development goals.
Although local communities were allowed to retain approved,
pre-existing land holdings, specific provision was made to
disallow the issuance of land titles to communities within the
NPA, or the use of their lands as collateral for securing
development loans (GoL 1993, Article 4). An official at the
Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (February 2015)
reflected on this difficulty, not only because more secure
ownership in the form of land titles might compete with
conservation goals, but also that it might conflict with state
interests: “we have to consider the livelihood needs of
communities, but also to consider when and how to take away the
land when it is appropriate, and transfer it to state uses, and the
best way to go about this. After all, of course, all land belongs to
the state.”  
Although boundary demarcation, zoning, and other spatial
classifications form an often unquestioned technology in the
management of environmental resources (Zimmerer 2003), these
spatializations are more than technical processes; they reflect and
reproduce power relationships within social–ecological spaces by
embodying particular environmental narratives (Walker and
Peters 2001). The various spatial processes in Xe Pian
differentiated “state” vs. “local” space claims, redefined the
meanings of these spaces and established legal norms for what
kinds of uses—and thus what kinds of social–ecological
outcomes—were (dis)allowed in each. These spatializations were,
however, socially differentiated both in the processes through
which they were produced as well as in the subsequent meanings
of those spaces and of the boundaries that enclose them. This
dynamic of differential access, ownership, and meaning—and the
ecological implications of these variations—are most clearly
exemplified in the related issues of security, timber extraction,
and trade in the NPA, subjects that will occupy much of the rest
of the paper.
MILITARIZATION, ROSEWOOD, AND THE BORDER
The spatialization of power within these remote areas on the
periphery of the state adjacent to international borders took on
a special character as they encountered discourses of state
security. Xe Pian’s social and ecological conditions—remote,
forested, and proximate to the Cambodian border—played an
important role in producing a space attractive not only to
conservationists but also to politico–military dissidents during
two historic periods.
Conflict legacies and the militarization of the timber trade
During the protracted conflicts of the 1960s and 1970s, several
thousand Lao and Vietnamese Communist insurgents took refuge
in Xe Pian, distant from both Royalist and colonial military forces
and protected by the forest canopy from aerial observation. A
local villager and former insurgent, now living on the outskirts of
the NPA recalled, “During the war, we lived for a long time in the
forest. The regular people could stay in the village but we, the
young men who fought for liberation, could not stay. We had to
live in the forest, maybe 10 km away [he points south]” (interview
2015). Villages further inside the NPA played a pivotal role in
hosting these insurgents. An elder in one village was proud, “we
were a revolutionary village. Fighters came from two provinces
to stay in our village” (interview 2014). More than a decade later
after Laos had achieved its independence, Xe Pian again became
the refuge of political refugees and military insurgents, as the
Khmer Rouge lost power in Cambodia and dissident fighters fled
across the border. These periods of insecurity loom large in social
memory. “Many years ago,” according to one village elder
(interview, June 2015), “the black-shirts [Khmer Rouge] came into
the forest, but mostly over toward the east and south. We were
afraid to go into the forest.” One conservation practitioner who
grew up in Xe Pian recalls his childhood during those years, “when
I was young, sometimes they would come to village and tell us
‘there are terrorists in the forest near the village’ and then we
would not go. I think the adults also were afraid, they were afraid
that if  someone saw them going into the forest, the government
would think they were collaborators with the black-shirts”
(interview, February 2015).  
Insecurities related to the intrusion of Khmer Rouge fighters and
more general concerns relating to national sovereignty and the
control of the international border have resulted in a large military
presence in Xe Pian. Although the primary strategic focus of the
military has been on the areas immediately adjacent to the
international border, the spaces controlled by state security forces
have been highly fluid in space and time in response to insurgency
events and, perhaps as often, opportunities for the extraction of
timber. The 1992–1993 biodiversity surveys, for example,
although persistently excluded from military controlled areas in
the Xe Kong Plains (Timmins et al. 1993), were also interrupted
by ad hoc military exclusions and the eviction of survey teams on
reports of “terrorists” in the Dong Kalo area. Temporary and
area-specific exclusions, however, were also used to restrict access
by both foreign advisors and state forest managers in cases
ostensibly unrelated to security, such as during road construction
(WWF 2013) and logging by the military (Claridge 2000).  
Although the militarization of space in Xe Pian interrupted
scientific surveys and the access of regulators—in this sense
apparently at odds with the goals of modernizing environmental
governance in the NPA—it also came to serve the practical
interests of conservation advocates where it produced enhanced
regulatory control and disarming of the local population. For
example, under the conviction that subsistence hunting and
poaching of marketable species were key local drivers of
biodiversity decline, the management plan instituted a ban on all
firearms in the NPA, “except for by government officials in
performance of their duties” (GoL 2000:49), with the police
carrying out operations to confiscate guns throughout villages in
the NPA on at least two occasions during the following 4 years
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(Poulsen and Luanglath 2005). Disarming the local population
in the interests of securing biodiversity values—all legitimized by
particular narratives of insecurity that framed local communities,
and not military agencies, as threats—was synchronous with the
expansion of state security forces, which began to play a more
active role in patrolling and law enforcement within the NPA.  
From the very beginning, conservation controls applied very
differently to different sets of actors in Xe Pian. Although local
threats to forest loss were largely controlled, commercial logging
by other actors continued apace regardless of its illegality under
Article 4 of PM 164. Biodiversity and habitat surveys by Timmins
et al. (1993), Duckworth et al. (1993), and Bezuijen et al. (2007)
all noted log landings and skid trails concentrated within the
south-central and southern portions of the NPA and along the
Cambodian border, such as at the security checkpoint at the
confluence of the Xe Pian and Xe Khampho rivers. Although
these did not generally attract official comment, a concession of
5,000 m³ of timber from the northern portions of the NPA inside
in 1999 prompted formal enquiry by project donors. Although
the concession was granted to a state–private joint-venture
company for the clearance of wind-fallen timber, a World Bank
investigator reported that timber was taken from an area of
approximately 8–9 km² within the NPA, with 83.5% of timber
being taken from standing trees (Claridge 2000). These logging
events, although substantial and apparently in direct conflict with
the provisions of PM 164 and the conservation objectives that
formed the basis of restricting local access to resources in Xe Pian,
were only a foreshadow of what was to come. The pace and scale
of logging operations and the dispute surrounding these
operations came to a head around 2010 as the global market for
rare tropical rosewoods, especially Dalbergia cochinchinensis,
exploded. Chinese demand for this rosewood—valued upwards
of US$50,000 per m³—incentivized an unprecedented expansion
of trade networks across Southeast Asia (Environmental
Investigations Agency (EIA) 2014) but especially within forested
areas along international borders such as Xe Pian, where the
remaining stocks of rosewood could still be harvested (Singh
2013). According to local communities, this led to the issuance of
logging permits to at least two companies in Xe Pian by 2012,
which, in the one case informed villagers that they had been
authorized to cut timber for the construction of houses for senior
government officials and, in the case of the other, to recover
rosewood that had been illegally logged by Cambodians (village
elders, May 2013). The military was similarly active, invoking state
security privilege to prompt the issuance of Prime Ministerial
Decree 111 (see GoL 2011) conferring control of forested border
areas to the military and a specific derivative concession to the
provincial military units to clear border areas within Xe Pian for
the purpose of establishing a road connecting Route 13 to the
confluence of the Xe Pian and Xe Khampho Rivers. These
provisions—albeit legal exceptions by executive decree—
provided a veneer of legitimacy to a much more ambitious
program of military expansion throughout Xe Pian. By 2013,
military logging encampments were reported in several areas
throughout Xe Pian far distant from those areas authorized under
PM 111 (interviews, April 2013).
Local agency, artisanal logging, and conflict
These efforts to enclose and control the social–ecological spaces
of Xe Pian, however aggressive or legitimized, were not
hegemonic. It was not only state-sanctioned companies and the
military that mobilized to take advantage of the lucrative
rosewood market. Local villagers became increasingly involved,
sometimes as guides for companies, but often on their own
initiative. One elder in a northern village explained, “We protected
this forest for years. When they announced the opening of the
protected area, they told us it was our national duty to protect
the forest. Now, they are all cutting—the big people, the military
—if they are going to cut, why shouldn’t we cut, too?” (interview,
February 2012). For some villagers, logging of timber in the
protected areas was a practical necessity in the face of endemic
poverty and economic insecurity. One woman explained, “The
rice is never enough, we plant each year but the snails eat it all.
There is nothing left for us to do but cut trees” (interviews, June
2015). Although in some cases, villagers were themselves involved
in illegal logging in Xe Pian and thus were not passive participants
in these globalized networks of trade, they participated on a highly
uneven field. Villager participation in the logging of rosewood
and other species, even for approved purposes, led to a spate of
arrests between 2012 and 2013 and heightened tension between
local communities and the military. A village leader recalled one
particular incident in March 2013, “We had gone to the forest to
collect timber for the construction of a house for a newly married
couple. When the military came, I fled deep into the forest. The
others, though, they were caught.” In this case, seven local
community members were imprisoned by the military, and their
equipment, hand-tractors, and timber confiscated. A
development practitioner working in the province lamented, “the
villagers [involved in timber harvesting] are really struggling. They
have to work in these dangerous conditions and fear getting
caught between the forest and the sawmill. But the people at the
top—the very people they are afraid of—they are the ones really
doing well from this, making a lot of money” (interview, June
2015). Although these conflicts centered on high-value rosewood,
the spatial distribution of these timber species within village areas
has had implications for the control of space more generally,
destabilizing local resource governance. One village elder
explained, “In the past, if  people from other villages wanted to
come and collect things from the forest, they would come to us
and ask permission. Now the military has taken over. They told
us ‘this forest belongs to the army now.’ Now people from other
villages don’t even ask us anymore, they just talk to the army”
(interview March 2013).  
Disputes over space and resources played out not only between
local communities and the military, but also between government
agencies within the NPA. The expansion of military power
throughout the NPA led directly to the retraction of the
administrative space of state forestry agencies. Driving past a
checkpoint in the NPA in March 2013, a forestry official
commented “these are supposed to be staffed by forestry staff  as
well as police and military, but now they have all been taken over
by military personnel. We cannot even carry out [law enforcement]
patrols anymore, the military will not allow us.”  
Tensions surrounding Xe Pian’s southern border with Cambodia,
and the flow of timber resources across this border, have become
increasingly international and militarized in recent years. In April
2016, the Royal Cambodian Army blockaded the movement of
supplies for the construction of a Lao military outpost along a
timber trade route, reputed to be within disputed border territory
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(Radio Free Asia 2016). Tensions simmered until February 2017,
when 400 troops of the Lao People’s Army crossed into Cambodia
to halt the construction of a road across the border from Xe Pian
NPA. The armed standoff continued until late February,
prompting an urgent meeting between Lao President Bounhang
Vorachit and Cambodia’s Prime Minister Hun Sen on 22
February in Phnom Penh (Khmer Times 2017).  
These disputes over space—and the governance of spatially
situated ecological resources—have all been conditioned not only
by the geographic expansion of the military, but also by the
discourses through which these actions have been legitimated
within Xe Pian. Dwyer et al. (2015) traced the ways in which
narratives of historical border insecurity have become intertwined
with contemporary notions of economic insecurity relating to the
leakage of valuable timber, justifying security exceptional modes
of governance along Laos’s border areas. In Xe Pian, these
discourses have also intersected with antecedent discourses of
environmental (in)security, materializing in a fluid, changing
geography as the social–ecological spaces of local communities
were further diminished by the aggressive extension of military
control. This reterritorialization has undermined local
community control and access to spatially distributed resources,
as well as the administrative spaces of state forestry agencies,
furthering ecological degradation and deforestation through
extensive logging. By 2014, 212 ha of the NPA were deforested
for the development of a military access road along the
Cambodian border (Hansen et al. 2013) that provided access for
extensive selective logging throughout the NPA. In June 2017, the
Deputy Prime Minister visited the Champasak Province to
pressure local authorities to address the increasingly visible timber
trade problem. Provincial authorities responded quickly,
confiscating illegal timber, officially reporting at least 54,000 m³
of logs stockpiled outside the NPA (Vientiane Times, 12 June
2017).  
Analysis of complex systems suggests that large-scale disturbance
events (catastrophic storms, flooding events, forest fires, etc.),
create lasting legacies with path-dependent social–ecological
outcomes through space and time (Adger 2000, Folke 2006,
Davidson 2010, Cumming 2011). We see here a particular sort of
disturbance legacy, relating to the sociopolitical upheaval
concomitant with war and its aftermath. Although the prolonged
presence of military (both during the Lao independence
movement and subsequent to the fall of the Khmer Rouge across
Xe Pian’s southern border) undoubtedly had immediate social–
ecological impacts, a lasting artifact of these disturbances was the
construction of narratives of insecurity that provided the
justification for militarization in Xe Pian and the enclosure of
border areas under the administration of state security agencies,
all of which created an enabling environment for large-scale
logging and the trafficking of high-value rosewood.
THE NEOLIBERAL MARKET AND THE
COMMODIFICATION OF XE PIAN NPA
These sorts of disputes over resource governance and access are,
of course, not unique to Xe Pian. The failure of traditional
“fortress conservation” models and growing unease with the
ineffectiveness of environmental administration by the state have
given rise to new sorts of discourses, propped up by a different
set of assumptions. Emphasizing the contribution of the
environment to the global socioeconomy through various
ecosystem services, and noting that specific monetary values can
be attached to these services, new forms of governance emphasize
the win–win of environmental conservation—that biodiversity
and other values can be conserved whilst also ensuring economic
growth if  the market is brought to bear upon the historically
intractable problems of environmental governance. The
neoliberal market—particularly a market propped up by the state
but liberated from its control—may be the savior of nature and
not its rival (Oels 2005).  
In the face of intractable drivers of global forest loss and climate
change, neoliberal environmental governance has found material
expression in REDD+, a market-oriented mechanism for
securing standing forest carbon stocks. Since its beginning, the
active management of Xe Pian depended almost entirely on
funding from foreign conservation NGOs and donors, pointing
again to the role of these actors in operationalizing power in the
NPA (Arts and Buizer 2009). The possibility of sustainably
financing conservation through the commodification of forest
carbon prompted the WWF to initiate the Xe Pian REDD+
project in 2013, beginning a new phase in the management of the
protected area. In a sense, the NPA provided an ideal space for
the implementation of REDD+, not only because of its
substantial carbon reserves but also because the now-weakened
ownership claims of local communities promised simpler
regulatory control and reduced project transactions costs. One
technical advisor explained (August 2014), “In the beginning, we
considered other options, but we realized that the tenure
arrangements outside of the NPA were too complicated, we would
have to sign separate agreements with many different land owners.
In the NPA, things were easier to control, transaction costs lower
because the land was all under the government. Also, there were
stronger regulations for land use inside the NPA already, which
we didn’t have outside.” The retraction of community control over
forest areas and the simplification of governance arrangements
under the state thus served to benefit the emergence of REDD+
in the NPA. These simplifications, however necessary to facilitate
REDD+, were not sufficient. The project had to grapple with the
issue of economic land concessions for rubber plantations (which,
in at least two cases, had displaced local land uses onto Xe Pian
(WWF 2013)) as well as the rather more intractable problem of
(officially and unofficially) approved military logging and forest
clearance—both key drivers of forest change in Xe Pian. Because
these drivers of forest change were authorized by state actors, they
were determined to constitute planned drivers of deforestation
and were thus ineligible for inclusion under REDD+ which, at
the project level, was designed to address unplanned deforestation
only. The spaces impacted by these—nearly 41% of the NPA (Fig.
3a)—were thus excised from the project area (WWF 2013). With
these areas removed from the project space, identification of the
drivers of deforestation and forest degradation was simpler and,
almost predictably, came once more to focus attention on local
communities. The technical lead on the project concluded that
“[Deforestation and forest degradation] is mainly caused by the
local population living in and around the NPA who need timber
for house construction and fuel wood” (interview, November
2011). Proposed interventions to mitigate these local drivers were
not surprising: boundary demarcation, improved zoning,
mapping, improved law enforcement and patrolling, and greater
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involvement of military and police with patrols (WWF 2013:20).
That these interventions would entail livelihood impacts in an
area with a high incidence of poverty was taken into consideration
by project developers, who recommended compensation for local
communities through off-farm employment and agricultural
intensification. Although the project was approved by the Verified
Carbon Standard in 2015 without an agreed upon benefit-sharing
mechanism to distribute carbon revenues, it was uncritically
assumed that financing for livelihood compensation would be
provided by the state forest agencies to whom these revenues
would accrue.  
In some sense, the REDD+ project represents something new in
Xe Pian, drawing on new discourses and incentive structures. By
commodifying carbon in existing forest stocks, REDD+
attributes new value to standing trees as an alternative to timber
harvesting or the conversion of forest for cash crops. Still in its
early stages, it remains to be seen whether REDD+ will be able
to deliver on both its environmental and social promises in Xe
Pian. We may anticipate a little, however, noting there are reasons
for concern. REDD+ articulates market-based solutions to issues
of forest governance in ways that may reinforce, rather than
challenge, the existing status quo (Okereke 2006, Ingalls and
Dwyer 2016). In the case of Xe Pian, this is manifest in the way
that REDD+ assiduously avoided the thorny issues of plantation
concessions and the problematic and legal-exceptional operations
of the military by extracting these geographies from its project
space, thus truncating the possibility of engaging with structural
drivers of forest change in Xe Pian (see Dwyer and Ingalls 2015
for a more detailed analysis). Furthermore, limiting its spaces of
engagement to those impacted by local livelihood practices,
REDD+ not only valorized a narrative that positioned local
communities (rather than commercial logging companies or the
military) as agents of degradation, it also reproduced historical
and socially problematic approaches to redefining the social–
ecological spaces of local communities. Through the creation of
new market values and by directing the revenue derived from these
values toward state agencies, REDD+ may function to further
centralize forest governance (Phelps et al. 2010) and produce new
conflicts between local forest users and forestry officials where
carbon and noncarbon values compete (Wilson and Howarth
2002).  
The creation of any new value intersects with existing values and
disputes and may variously reproduce or change them (Fabinyi
et al. 2014). The enabling conditions within Xe Pian that
facilitated REDD+, such as large carbon stocks, heightened
regulatory control, and limited local ownership claims were the
legacy of PM164 and subsequent measures to maintain forest
stocks by delimiting the territorial claims of local communities
and promoting greater government control. Whatever its explicit
and implicit assumptions and promises, REDD+ was thus not
introduced into a blank and undifferentiated space. Rather, it
mapped out problematically across a sociopolitical space that had
been shaped by antecedent resource claims, regulatory controls,
and spatialized power networks (see also Buizer et al. 2014). In
this sense, REDD+ is less new than it was presented to be. The
proposed activities of REDD+, the distribution of its costs and
benefits, all reflect and reproduce pre-existing power asymmetries
among local resource users, state agencies, and international
conservation organizations. As with previous interventions in Xe
Pian, REDD+ links these local social–ecological systems to
global networks of power, this time through the neoliberal carbon
market. How these new networks of power impinge upon these
systems, and with what implications for social–ecological
processes and outcomes, will play an important role in the
resilience of these systems far into the future.
THE SPATIALIZATION OF POWER IN SOCIAL–
ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS: SOME FURTHER
OBSERVATIONS
I have sought to demonstrate that analysis of complex systems
necessarily entails the unbundling of the social–ecological
relationships in space and through time and the interrogation of
the power asymmetries that constitute and politicize ostensibly
technical and managerial interventions in the governance of
social–ecological systems. Dispute involves not only a range of
actors but also an equally broad range of attributed values. Xe
Pian as, variously, a livelihood resource, a habitat for species of
global significance, a source of commercially valuable timber, or
a store of carbon as a solution to global climate change, forms
the objects of these disputes that overlap in space and time. There
are four general observations that emerge from this.  
First, power relationships become written onto the spaces of
social–ecological systems through patterns of access, inclusion,
exclusion, and control across space and through time, with
important implications for the analysis and management of
social–ecological systems. In Xe Pian NPA, these spatializations
found material expression through the interaction of global
ecoregional assessments and national forest planning, drilling
down to increasingly local levels through processes of
demarcating the boundaries of Xe Pian, management zonation
throughout the NPA, and village-specific LFA processes. These
spatializations constituted a clear reorganization of space and the
attributed meanings of those spaces, uses, and management
outcomes, (re)producing asymmetric relationships of power.
Although the social processes that produced new spatial
arrangements in Xe Pian NPA were framed as mere technical
interventions necessary to secure environmental values—the
legitimacy of which was selfevident and presumably
uncontestable (Escobar 1999)—their implications were clearly
more than technical in nature. Boundaries (and other forms of
spatialization), we are reminded, are not objects so much as
expressions of social relationships, carrying socially differentiated
meanings that vary by actor (Ribot and Peluso 2003), allowing
some forms of access to some resources for certain people while
excluding other people and/or other uses. Whether some spatial
object (whether field, fallow, or forest) was mapped into the
protected area or not, zoned for conservation or use, or
categorized for some specific purpose necessarily entails
particular social and ecological outcomes. Insofar as these
intersected with contested social values and produced differential
social–ecological outcomes, they are moral and political acts and
should be analyzed as such (Cote and Nightingale 2012, Ingalls
and Stedman 2016). This impinges on (at least) two core precepts
in resilience: (1) selforganization and decentralization in
management and (2) hardening of system boundaries. The
resilience of a particular social–ecological system depends in large
part on the ability of that system to selforganize, a condition
enabled by decentralization in management (Chaffin et al. 2016,
Walker et al. 2004). As spatial processes within Xe Pian
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increasingly refined and demarcated various areas, state forest
agencies assumed control of larger and larger forested areas,
mitigating and limiting the direct control of local communities,
such as over nontimber and other forest products as highlighted
above where these resources came under the control of forestry
and state security agencies. Those areas in which local
communities retained direct control were yet further restrained
by zonation performed under the LFA, which specified what sorts
of uses were (il)licit. As we have seen, however, even the limited
control domain of local communities has in some cases been
erased, perhaps temporarily, by the expansion of military control.
The externally driven rearrangement of space creates scalar
mismatches between the spatial dimensions of key system
processes and the spatial management domains of local
institutions, undermining adaptive management (Cash et al. 2006,
Cumming et al. 2006). That these multilevel spatial categories and
associated land uses and regulatory controls were inflexible
through time points to implications for the second of these core
principles of resilience: the ability of systems to change and adapt
and change over time in response to changing system conditions.
Insofar as change (vs. stasis) is the norm within complex systems,
the hardening and formalization of boundaries without clear
processes for modification critically undermines adaptive
capacity (Nelson et al. 2007, Yarrow and Marín 2007). This is
particularly problematic where local participation in the
designation of these zones was limited at the outset (Zimmerer
2003).  
Second, although each of these interventions (e.g., formation of
the NPA, securitization, and REDD+) were in some sense new,
they were shaped by antecedent social–ecological conditions.
These included biophysical characteristics—especially large
tracts of forest, sparse population density, and remoteness—
allowing for and prompting conservation interests as well as
creating conditions attractive to politico-military dissidents
whose presence in these forests in turn gave rise to questions of
(in)security and militarization. The distribution of high-value
rosewood species along the border further complicated these
spatial relationships and provided the impetus for particular
expressions of power related to regional timber markets and the
role of the military as a market actor. This all suggests that the
spatialization of policies and interventions do not map onto blank
social–ecological spaces. Whatever the explicit goals of
management interventions, these are shaped in practice by
antecedent system conditions in ways that confound linear causal
pathways between policies and programs and their social–
ecological outcomes, while also functioning to reproduce historic
power asymmetries. Conceptualizing this within the panarchy
cycle (an oft-referenced conceptual object in resilience thinking),
these system preconditions may be seen to constitute large, slow
variables that frame and shape local, faster processes (see
Gunderson 2001, Cumming 2011). Although some of these are
material in nature (e.g., distribution of high-value timber
resources and attributes of forest density), others are political and
discursive. Historic military insecurity fostered the construction
of narratives of insecurity that legitimized the expansion of
military control through these areas, constituting a form of
postdisturbance legacy.  
Third, although the dynamic interplay of power materializes in
very local spaces, social actors draw on extralocal discourses to
lend power to disputed narratives and legitimize and bolster
competing claims. These disputes are bound up in (not only)
socially constructed environmental narratives that (de)legitimize
the claims of actors who compete across a very uneven terrain.
These legitimizing discourses—invoking (for example) conservationist
necessity, national security, or the urgency of climate mitigation
—draw on other, cross-scale networks of power involving
international conservation organizations, forestry and state
security agencies, and global carbon markets. Common-pool
resources are increasingly cast as global resources, and thus in an
increasingly globalized world, local actors are perhaps more
marginalized in cross-scale interactions and power negotiations
because they are far outweighed (Adger et al. 2006). These global
environmental claims found their earliest expression in the
formation of Xe Pian through the application of MacKinnon and
MacKinnon’s (1986) biogeographic zonations, which were
disaggregated by conservationists to map out Laos’s NPA system.
New environmental claims relating to mandates for the protection
of species of global significance and, later, carbon sequestration
and avoided deforestation intersected with questions of state
security and regional timber markets to further marginalize local
actors (Dwyer et al. 2015). It is suggestive, I think, to observe that
the invocation of these higher-order claims in the ordering of
local spaces suggests a new application for one of spatial
resilience’s core concepts of spatial subsidies (see, e.g., Carpenter
et al. 2001, Cumming 2011, Allen et al. 2016): subsidies may be
discursive as well as material.  
Finally, although the landscape of dispute and negotiation is
highly uneven, we are reminded that power is never hegemonic in
its expression, being variously reproduced or attenuated both by
lateral competing power claims (such as between state security
forces and forestry officials) as well as by vertical dispute of power
by local actors. Communities exhibited active agency through
opposition to boundary claims, negotiation of livelihood spaces,
and through their active participation in illegal logging in the
NPA. This suggests that although policy may undermine local
management, there are finer channels through which
communities exert a measure of control over social–ecological
space. This instills some hope for agency and local resilience while
also reminding us that the expression of this agency may also be
problematic, such as in the participation of local communities in
the trafficking of endangered rosewood. Although formal
institutional processes within Xe Pian have allowed for some
degree of local participation, it is significant to note that
expressions of agency illustrated above were largely outside of
these formal processes and, in some cases at least, illegal. Social
resilience is in large part an emergent property of local agency
(Pain and Levine 2012, Westley et al. 2013) and the degree to
which larger social structures foster local participation in
management and the distribution of resources and risks between
scales (Adger et al. 2006). The degree of procedural and
distributive justice in these negotiations plays a central role in the
building of social capital between local managers and larger social
institutions, another key element in resilience and adaptive
governance (Adger 2001, Lebel et al. 2006, Nelson et al. 2007).
Although resilience may be best fostered through participatory
and navigational management processes (Ross and Berkes 2013),
the formal management of Xe Pian has, in the main, been
prescriptive in nature and characterized by limited local
participation.
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CONCLUSION
These observations have, I think, important implications for the
practice of research and management. In the first place, they
reinforce calls to attend to both social and ecological dimensions
of complex systems. Although management interventions to
secure important conservation values in Xe Pian may foster
resilience along environmental dimensions, a lack of attention to
social elements and processes—and, in particular, how
asymmetrical power relationships operate within these—appears
to run at cross purposes, undermining other critical elements of
resilience. This suggests that more attention should be paid to the
implicit operations of power within complex systems that may
operate below the radar of institutional analyses. Complex
systems research should focus not only on formal management
arrangements, but also on the subtext of how these have come
about, the assumptions that support them, and their implications
for real-world outcomes. This may not only nuance and
problematize analysis of complex systems, but may produce
entirely different insights and indicate quite different directions
for research and management. Second, this suggests that not only
managers, but also scholars and researchers are themselves bound
up in these power dynamics. The discourses that (de)legitimize
various approaches to ordering social–ecological relationships
across space–time enjoy varying degrees of purchase among
analysts and construct the taken-for-granted frames of reference
that inform research practice. To whatever degree researchers
variously draw on, support, or undermine competing social and
environmental narratives, they become active agents in these
disputes, highlighting the moral and ethical implications of
resilience scholarship. A resilience framework sensitized to the
operations of power across the spatial and temporal domains of
complex systems may not only demonstrate enhanced analytic
capacity but also greater liberating potential for subaltern actors
in society.  
This all suggests a fruitful line of enquiry. More work needs to be
done in untangling the spatialities of power within social–
ecological systems across a range of settings including, for
example, how power manifests during armed conflict and periods
of political and institutional transition, or how these processes
intersect with global environmental change.
Responses to this article can be read online at: 
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/issues/responses.
php/9543
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